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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of a protracted period of low monetary policy rates on 
loosening of banks’ credit standards concerning enterprises, households and consumer loans. 
Using a balanced panel dataset of 9 countries that have taken part ever since the initiation of 
the Euro area Bank Lending Survey, this study focuses on three different time frames of pre- 
(2002Q4-2008Q3), mid- (2008Q4-2010Q4) and post- (2011Q1-2014:Q4) financial crisis. The 
results indicate that low short term interest rates prior to the crisis produce a disproportionate 
loosening of credit standards in all three types of loans. In spite of the scope of expansionary 
monetary policy documented primarily in the post-crisis sample, the data analysed indicates 
that negative Taylor-rule residuals lead only to a softening of total lending standards for 
enterprises loans. Additionally, the outcomes of this study indicate that the European Central 
Bank 3 year long-term refinancing operations brought a fall in the progress of banks’ credit 
tightening. However, the benefits of this have yet to be experienced in the EA9 real economy. 
While regrouping the original sample in stressed nations, the results suggest that excessive risk-
taking in bank lending behaviour took place, especially during periods of low monetary policy 
rates both pre- and post-crisis.  
JEL classification: E44, E50, E52, E58, G01. 
Keywords: Monetary policy, Bank lending Survey, Euro area, LTROs announcement, Panel data. 
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1. Introduction 
The euro was introduced to international financial markets in 1999 and was a crucial course of 
action in European integration, merging the biggest trade bloc at the time and establishing a 
powerful world currency. The euro is the single currency in 19 of the European Union's 
Member States which combine to form the ‘Eurozone’. The European Central Bank (ECB) 
functions in part to steer the monetary policy in the ‘Eurozone’, a world economy trumped only 
by the United States.   
The 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has had a detrimental impact on bank lending 
in the main industrialised nations, together with the Euro Area (EA) with significant levels of 
heterogeneity within the different nations (Ciccarelli et al., 2013; De Santis and Surico, 2013). 
As a result, this has had negative repercussions for banks’ health, with respect to cost of funds 
and balance sheet; therefore, their capacity to approve loans or credit lines has been diminished. 
Empirical studies implicate the origin of the financial crisis as stemming from an immoderate 
relaxation of lending standards as a result of excessively low levels of short-term policies 
accepted in the central banks (Taylor, 2009; Allen and Carletti, 2010; Maddaloni and Peydro, 
2011; Forbes, 2015, among others). Accordingly, with the purpose of assisting liquidity levels 
within EA banks, the ECB carried out two long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) in 
December 2011 and February 2012 where a total sum of €1 trillion cheap loans was injected 
into the EA banking system. 
Moreover, in light of the GFC of recent times and the ensuing protracted periods of record low 
real interest rates prevalent in the more established economic nations, the debate regarding the 
tendency of economic entities to assume additional risk during periods of low interest rates has 
been resurrected.1 Accordingly, this question has fuelled speculation regarding the effects of 
the risk-taking channel, a further mechanism in monetary policy transmission, on the credit 
supply. The current available literature regarding this subject is indecisive, meriting additional 
research. 
The aim of this study is to build on the empirical works by Maddaloni and Peydro (2011/2013) 
through empirically developing the evaluation of the EA Bank Lending Survey (BLS) and 
highlighting the 9 EA countries that participated since the initiation of the survey. 
Having identified a gap in the existing literature, this study attempts to add to the current 
research by considering the post-financial crisis time frame. Additional new queries 
                                                          
1 See Diamond and Rajan (2006), Adrian and Shin (2010), Borio and Zhu (2012, Jimenez et al. (2014) and 
Ioannidou et al. (2015), among others. 
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corresponding to consumer credit in parallel with those related enterprises and households will 
therefore be addressed. In this case the EA embodies a novel institutional environment with a 
collective monetary policy. Moreover, inside this region, capital to the corporate segment is 
primarily supplied by banks, which is equal to approximately 80% as proposed by Allen et al. 
(2004).  
The contributions of this study to the existing literature are fourfold: (1) the period following 
the financial crisis experienced an additional decline in short term interest rates, so much so 
that the value remained negative throughout this period.2 Accordingly, the influence of 
monetary policy rates on lending standards for this time frame is analysed with the purpose of 
deciding if maintaining policy rates at a previously unsurpassed low value has actually resulted 
in additional relaxation of bank’s credit standards; (2) the time frames pre-, mid- and post-crisis 
are independently evaluated, given that the ECB does not have a policy of publicly reporting 
the survey data for Austria, Ireland and Finland in net percentage terms; therefore, the prior 
results obtained by Maddaloni and Peydro (2011/2013) cannot be the sole basis of reference, 
given that their conclusions are sourced from the and the U.S. opinion survey and 12 
‘Eurozone’ nations that contributed from the beginning of the survey. Consequently, the 
nations chosen for empirical analysis are as follows: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain; (3) the selected countries are grouped 
according to the effects as well as the severity of the financial crisis into two panels of A and 
B. Panel A consists of Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, while Panel B contains Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands. The purpose of this task is to evaluate the impact 
of monetary policy rates on banks’ margins concerning riskier loans particularly for the pre- 
and post-financial crisis periods; (4) the efficiency of the ECB 3 year long-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs) that were carried out in December 2011 and February 2012 are evaluated 
in great depth in order to determine whether banks’ credit standards have been relaxed and 
ascertain the degree to which demand for loans has risen considering that a total sum of €1 
trillion cheap loans was injected into the EU banking system under these operations. 
This study is structured in the following layout: Section 2 presents a review of the empirical 
literature, Section 3 details an in-depth outline of the data and methodological framework, 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results, while section 5 provides the conclusions. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Figure.4 documents the trend of short term interest rates in the EA9 countries. 
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2. Literature review 
In order to fully grasp the concepts discussed in this study, it would be prudent to briefly review 
the fundamentals of the terms intrinsic to the subject. First, this section offers a crucial analysis 
of the empirical studies which utilised the lending survey data of the EA in conjunction with 
data from the US. Subsequently, we examine the topical discussion during the time frame of 
low interest rates and their effects on banks’ lending behaviour. In addition, the recent measures 
adopted by the ECB in the wake of the financial crisis are examined here, noting the cautious 
lending behaviour by banks to the public and the private sector. Lastly, research questions with 
their corresponding supporting rationales are presented. 
2.1 What do lending surveys actually reveal about the impact of monetary policy? 
Ever since January 2003 after the BLS specific to the EA was initiated, researchers have been 
increasingly curious to analyse its data. Yet, given the survey’s brief nature, such an 
investigation was delayed and is only now being explored.  
De Bondt et al. (2010) demonstrate that data in the BLS allows the estimation of realised and 
expected credit standards in the EA. The study suggests that, in addition to loan demand and 
the official interest rate, bank loan supply factors, the balance sheet position of borrowers and 
risk perception in the economy should also be included when determining important factors for 
bank credit and real GDP growth. Similarly, Hempell and Kok Sorensen (2010) utilise an 
identical approach and information with the purpose of conducting an investigation that 
concentrates on the crisis phase while, analysing the comparative significance attributed to 
different elements responsible for supply limitations.   
An examination of the available literature reveals that just a handful of studies have benefited 
from the bank-level BLS information. The Blaes (2011) study investigates the potential 
function of limitations applying to banks by characterising the distinct decrease in bank lending 
to German non-financial corporations (NFCs) throughout the course of the credit crisis. The 
study reports that the stifling influence of limitations applied to banks was harshest from 
quarter three of 2009 to quarter one of 2010. Correspondingly, a study by Del Giovane et al. 
(2011) merges micro data regarding the cost of lending together with data concerning loan 
regulations taken from banks in Italy partaking in the survey. The study concludes that supply 
elements, for example balance sheet positions and perceived credit risk, are important, yet 
subtle, influences on the decline of bank loans throughout Italy during the crisis period from 
2007 to 2009. 
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Concentrating on the EA nations, Maddaloni and Peydro (2013) evaluate the influence of short-
term interest rates and macroprudential policy on lending standards prior to the recent crisis, 
and regarding the provision of central bank liquidity throughout the crisis utilising the BLS 
data from 2002Q4-2010Q4, the outcome implies that monetary policy rates and central bank 
provision of long-term liquidity function in a supplementary capacity to obviate a potential 
credit crisis for firms 
When examining the US Berger and Udell (2004) utilise individual bank-level data of US 
banks’ lending standards during the period 1980–2000. The research offers supporting data by 
demonstrating that the reduced capacity of the loan officer may be employed as a reason for 
the detected pro-cyclicality specific to bank loans. Furthermore, Lown and Morgan (2006) 
employ a VAR examination through utilising macro-data gathered by the Federal Reserve’s 
Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SOSLP) and demonstrate that variation in the credit supply 
standards assist in forecasting progress in lending and economic activity.3 The study 
demonstrates that each recession period has preceded a period of modest constriction of credit 
standards.  
A seminal paper by Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) utilising a novel collection of data from the 
EA and the U.S. bank lending standards suggests that low (monetary policy) short-term interest 
rates relax standards for both household and corporate loans. This relaxation—particularly for 
mortgages—is augmented through securitisation action, supervision for bank capital and low 
monetary policy rates for a protracted time frame. On the other hand, low long-term interest 
rates fail to relax lending standards. Ultimately, nations with more relaxed lending standards 
prior to the crisis corresponding to negative Taylor rule residuals subsequently produced a 
poorer economic display. Such conclusions aid in elucidating the source of the crisis, while 
also offering signification implications to policy.  
Moreover, Bassett et al. (2014) utilise research to take advantage of the bank level reaction to 
the SOSLP; the results show that modified lending standards, adapted for the macroeconomic 
and bank-related elements, influence loan demand. Constrictive shocks affecting the credit 
supply result in a significant decrease in output and the capacity of businesses and households 
to borrow funds from banks, in addition to broadening credit spreads and an easing of monetary 
policy. 
 
                                                          
3 In order to examine empirical investigations which utilise SOSLP, please refer to Lown at al. (2000), Lown and 
Morgan (2002), Cunningham (2006), Basistha & Kurov (2008), Hirtle (2009), Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010) and 
Becker & Ivashina (2014), among others. 
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2.2 Low interest rates monetary framework and bank lending behaviour 
The debate of whether low interest rates could involve additional risk-taking through bank 
lending behaviour has developed into a primary point of contention in contemporary economic 
literature and among practitioners. Yet, the contemporary available literature regarding this 
subject is indecisive, warranting further investigation. 
Indeed the justification for a risk-taking channel in the presence of low interest rates 
could be that these conditions motivate asset managers to assume additional risk for three types 
of reasons: behavioural, contractual or institutional (Rajan, 2006).4 The aforementioned 
explanation is known as the ‘search for yield’ and leads to an unusually high rise in demand 
for riskier assets with the potential for higher returns from banks.  
The risk-taking channel in the transmission of monetary policy is well-defined by Borio and 
Zhu (2012) which characterise the channel as the effect of variations in policy rates with respect 
to either risk-tolerance or perception of risk; specifically, these policy changes affect the 
magnitude of risk present in portfolios, the valuation of assets and the extension of funding 
both in price and non-price components.5 In contrast, elevated interest rates diminish banks’ 
net worth resulting in “gambling for resurrection” as a solution (Kane, 1989). One method of 
reinforcing this influence is practicing extensive utilisation of Value-at-Risk approaches for 
economic and regulatory capital objectives (Danielsson et al., 2004). A study conducted by 
Gambacorta (2009) highlights that rising markets confer increased stability, which allows 
financial firms to take advantage of their risk budgets, promoting position-taking. 
By the same token, Adrian and Shin (2010) suggest a model in which banks actively modify 
their balance sheets to reflect economic conditions; specifically, they offer more leverage 
during economic booms and less during bursts. Therefore, it can be said in this case that 
leverage is procyclical.6  
The results from a seminal study by Jimenez et al. (2014) indicate that banks are far more 
inclined to undertake high-risk lending practices as a result of lower overnight interest rates. In 
fact, these conditions appear to motivate banks with relatively less funding to accept increased 
numbers of loan applications from firms that were previously considered too risky. If an 
application was approved, the loan was for an unusually high amount and not secured through 
                                                          
4 Similarly, Adrian et al. (2010) stress that changes to the monetary policy stance impact the essential “risk 
appetite” of financial intermediaries. 
5 Borio and Zhu (2012) argue that the procyclical influence from assessments of probability of default, loss given 
default, correlations and volatilities is a robust indicator of the effect of risk perceptions. See as well Allen and 
Gale (2000), Diamond and Rajan (2006), and Acharya and Naqvi (2012), among others.  
6 Leverage of this nature is interpreted as the result of banks’ activity and management which serve to enhance 
their balance sheets in response to variations in measured risk and prices. 
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use of collateral. Additionally, loan applications approved by lesser-funded banks are also more 
likely to default under conditions of low overnight rates. However, long-term lower interest 
rates along with current account deficits, securitisation and additional important macro 
variables do not have this impact. The study concludes that monetary policy does have an 
impact on credit supply composition, especially when analysing credit risk.  
From 1999 to 2003 in Bolivia there were substantial fluctuations in the federal funds rate. 
Ioannidou et al. (2015) investigate the effect of this rate on the pricing and risk of new bank 
loans during this period. The results indicate that reduced US federal funds rates before loan 
origination increase the likelihood of default for bank loans granted to individuals for each 
month. Moreover, banks with higher liquidity and lesser funding from foreign sources assume 
additional risk during periods of low federal funding. Under these conditions such banks even 
decrease loan distribution in spite of the presumed higher element of risk associated with this 
strategy. 
2.3 Expansionary monetary policy vs. cautious lending by Eurozone banks: 
In the subsequent aftermath of contemporary financial turmoil, lending to small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) became the number one priority to consider for governing authorities 
worldwide considering that they are commonly referred to as the backbone of the EU economy; 
this is particularly the case within the context of cautious lending when banks are disinclined 
to increase lending activity and volume irrespective of the monetary policy stance.  
While analysing the goal of the ECB, Cour-Thimann and Winkler (2012) state that the central 
bank employs non-standard measures that act as a complement to the standard interest rate 
policy rather than as a replacement for it. These non-standard measures have been primarily 
targeted towards banks in order to avoid chaotic deleveraging in the EA economy and enhance 
liquidity and funding (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2012). Accordingly, the ECB’s 
unconventional monetary policies are expected to safeguard the ability of solvent banks in the 
region to maintain lending to the public and private sectors. 
A study by Ciccarelli et al. (2013) investigates the monetary transmission via banks of different 
sizes and finds that, by the end of 2011, the effects of borrower’s credit frictions were not 
attenuated, particularly in the struggling nations. Given that smaller banks generally lend to 
SMEs, the study suggests that the procedures implemented until 2011 likely failed to rectify 
issues regarding credit availability which arose from adverse risk conditions and the declining 
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net worth of firms. This conclusion is especially relevant to smaller firms in distressed EA 
nations. 
Upon examining data from 91 large banks in 45 nations, Beck et al. (2011) determine that 
foreign, domestic private and government-owned banks utilise a variety of lending 
technologies and organisational structures for the purpose of financing SMEs. Loans to these 
smaller firms, specifically in the context of extent, type and pricing, are weakly correlated with 
the aforementioned technologies and structures, signifying that ‘relationship lending’ need not 
be the sole basis for SME loans.7 
In order to determine the relationship between monetary policy and lending in Europe, De 
Santis and Surico (2013) evaluate balance sheet data of the four largest economies in the EA 
sampled from 1999 to 2011. The study reveals that in Germany and Italy, which both house a 
relatively large number of banks, the impact of monetary policy on lending was pronounced 
and diverse. In contrast, the impact in Spain was relatively weak and France experienced a 
more homogenous effect; both nations are characterised by a relatively higher degree of market 
concentration. Furthermore, some data suggests that monetary policy has a greater influence 
on the relatively smaller savings banks in Italy, and the savings and cooperative banks that 
possess relatively low liquidity and capital in Germany.  
In the EA the recent economic crisis has had a negative impact on the monetary transmission 
mechanism (Öztürk and Mrkaic, 2014). When conducting an analysis to determine the level of 
access that SMEs have to bank financing, data from several thousand firms from the EA reveals 
that the costs associated with modifications to the leverage of the borrower as well as bank 
funding affect the aforementioned access to finance for these smaller firms. Specifically, 
greater borrowers’ debt-to-asset ratios and bank financing costs are adversely and significantly 
correlated with SMEs’ access to financing.   
Furthermore, monetary policy inside the Eurozone experienced ‘fragmenting’, specifically in 
terms of the fact that reduced interest rates determined by the ECB did not influence the banks 
in periphery nations to stop charging high lending rates by banks in said countries, relative to 
the ‘core’ nations. Accordingly, these higher interest rates documented in the periphery nations 
exhibited a risk associated with the exchange rate that would normally be absent from a 
                                                          
7 In support of this conclusion, Beck et al. (2011) also find little significant variation regarding the extent, type 
and pricing of SME funding among different types of banks. Alternatively, significant variation is found between 
developed and developing nations, considered to be a result of variation in legal and institutional financial systems. 
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completely developed monetary union, which served to warp the allotment of capital and 
hinder lending activity and volume to SMEs especially, leading to poor economic growth in 
the periphery nations (Mullineux, 2015). 
In June 2014 the ECB issued a package of measures utilising a strategy comparable to that of 
the UK’s ‘Funding for Lending Scheme’ (FLS) overseen by HM Treasury and the Bank of 
England. In August 2012 the FLS began offering cheap loans for up to a period of four years 
to financial institutions that demonstrated increased mortgage and SME lending. However, the 
FLS has not managed to successfully stimulate a significant increase in lending to SMEs in the 
UK. Notwithstanding, the ECB is set to enact a ‘Targeted LTRO’ (TLTRO) scheme that 
facilitates expanded access to cheap financing for SME lending (Mullineux, 2015). In order to 
support this scheme and to stimulate the future SME lending market, the ECB is also 
considering the benefits of buying SME-loan backed securities. When evaluating studies for 
relevance to these issues, it is important to note that most of the available literature on 
unconventional monetary policy does not consider the ECB’s 3 year long-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs) which were carried out in December 2011 and February 2012 where a 
total sum of €1 trillion cheap loans was injected into the banking system in order to facilitate 
lending by bank to SMEs that were hit by the crisis in the Eurozone.8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 One exception to this is Darracq-Paries and De Santis (2015) which used the BLS data from 2003Q1-2011Q4 
and just the un-published ad-hoc questionnaire of the BLS in February 2012 to estimate a panel VAR for the Euro 
area countries. 
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In this study, we carry out an empirical assessment through evaluating the subsequently 
outlined research questions in the EA9: 
Hypothesis I: do protracted periods of low monetary conditions prior to the financial crisis 
result in an excessive relaxation of banks’ credit standards as applied to approval of loans or 
credit lines to enterprises, households and consumer credit? 
The first hypothesis can be tested by adopting the following reasoning: in the pre-crisis model 
we expect to substantiate a link between the effect of low level of interest rates and softening 
of banks’ credit standards to three types of loans issued by banks (in keeping with Maddaloni 
and Peydro (2011)). Accordingly, total banks’ credit standards are examined and influencers 
of this variable originating from cost of funds and balance sheet constraint are investigated.  
Hypothesis II: has the intensity of this relationship changed in response to the expansionary 
monetary policy both during and after the financial crisis? 
It is worthwhile to note the scale of the expansionary monetary policy in both mid- and post-
crisis periods, characterised by low policy rates, in which 21 successive  quarters saw the 
weighted average for Taylor rule residuals stay negative during 2009:Q4-2014:Q4. The second 
question is verified through adopting and using the same methodological approach as outlined 
in the first question; therefore, the potential modification to banks’ credit standards is revealed. 
Hypothesis III: does the data support the idea of excessive risk-taking behaviour by banks in 
stressed vs. non-stressed countries of the EA9 prior to the onset of financial crisis and has there 
been some enhancement in this respect post-crisis?  
The third test is conducted by regrouping the selected countries in our original sample 
according to the effects as well as the severity of the financial crisis into two panels of A and 
B. Panel A consists of Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, while Panel B contains Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands. The purpose of this task is to evaluate the 
impact of monetary policy rates on banks’ margins concerning riskier loans, particularly for 
the pre- and post-financial crisis periods. On a related note, Ciccarelli et al. (2013) imply that 
banks within stressed countries in the EA relied more on the liquidity offered via the 
Eurosystem. Hence, relative to Panel B countries, Panel A countries are predicted to practice 
more excessive risk-taking behaviour during the pre-crisis period in connection with the 
previously mentioned three categories of loans; this may be deemed a potential cause that 
exacerbated the economic impact of the recent crisis. Accordingly, this present study conducts 
additional testing to reveal any progress in this respect in the selection obtained in the post-
crisis period. 
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Hypothesis IV: does the ECB’s 3 LTROs liquidity injection into the EU banking system 
translate into a softening of bank lending standards and the degree to which the demand for 
loans has risen corresponding to enterprises, households and consumer credit? 
Fourth, with the purpose of determining the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy 
tools, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) and Fungáčová, et al. (2014) deliberate the 
proxy in their respective investigations, which is specified as a ratio of each central total assets 
to nominal GDP (Assets/GDP ratio). Considering the non-usage of bank level data in this 
present study, such a method is not feasible here. Consequently, the BLS quarterly data is relied 
upon, particularly the modification within credit standards and demand during the course of 
implementing these measures. The aim of this exercise is to determine whether such processes 
translated into a softening of lending standards/conditions and to ascertain the degree to which 
the demand for loans has risen corresponding to enterprises, households and consumer credit 
in the nations being analysed. 
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3. Data 
3.1 Bank Lending Survey 
The primary dataset employed in this present research is sourced from the BLS that is directed 
at senior loan officers of a representative sample of the EA banks and considers the traits of 
their corresponding national banking structure and in so doing calls upon them to supply 
quarterly data regarding the lending standards that banks offer borrowers and on the loan 
demand that banks require. The primary directive of the BLS is to increase comprehension with 
respect to bank lending behaviour in the EA. The queries differentiate between three types of 
loan: loans or credit lines to enterprises, loans to households for house purchase, and consumer 
credit and other lending to households. 
The investigation is conducted as a questionnaire comprising qualitative questions regarding 
modifications to loan conditions and demand logged over the course of the preceding three 
months, and future developmental projections of the same data in the period of the subsequent 
quarter. The survey questions outlined in the BLS contain five optional answers. The options 
span “tightened considerably” to “eased considerably” for the enquires corresponding to 
modifications in credit standards and from “increased considerably” to “decreased 
considerably” for the enquiries corresponding to loan demands. The replies are communicated 
with respect to net percentage, a value calculated as the difference between the percentage of 
banks announcing that credit standards were tightened and the percentage of banks indicating 
that the standards have been eased.  
A positive value for the net percentage shows that a greater share of banks have tightened credit 
standards (“net tightening”), while a negative net percentage means that more banks have eased 
credit standards (“net easing”). Similarly, the expression “net demand” represents the 
difference between the percentage of banks showing a rise in loan demand and the percentage 
of banks experiencing a fall in said demand. Accordingly, net demand will thus have a positive 
value if a higher percentage of banks experience greater loan demand, while a negative value 
for net demand signifies that a higher percentage of banks have experienced decreased loan 
demand.  
Results from the bank data analysed in the BLS sample are subject to a two-step aggregation. 
In the first step, results from solitary banks are aggregated to that of the EA nations’ national 
results. Here bank responses are divided into two main categories: those that are aggregated to 
national results via application of implicit weighting to the sample or aggregation via explicit 
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weighting derived from the unresolved quantities of loans issued to non-financial corporations 
and households of lone banks in the corresponding samples taken from each nation.9  
The second step consists of aggregating the national BLS results to the EA (BLS) results. 
Accordingly, survey responses from each nation are aggregated to the EA BLS via the 
application of an explicit weighting scheme founded on the national shares in the values of 
unresolved loans to the aforementioned borrowers. Following the weighting schemes, the 
nations’ results are combined to form the EA aggregate by utilising each nation’s loans from 
the combined total unresolved loans in the area to residents. Conversely, weighting is not 
applied at the domestic level, suggesting that the individual banks are equally considered.10 
In 2015 the selection is made up of 142 participating banks spanning the 19 EA nations; yet, 
for the purpose of this present empirical study, 9 out 12 nations partaking from the beginning 
of the survey are also tested here.11  
The selected banks are carefully chosen in such a way as to offer an accurate depiction of the 
EA banking segment, while considering dissimilarities in the banking system between nations. 
Hence, the problem of sample selection bias may be avoided since the time frame being 
analysed corresponded with growth in the selection size as a result of the expansion of the EA. 
Statistics concerning the EA BLS are accessible since the last quarter of 2002.  
The model used in this study is built in a manner to factor in any distinct modification on banks’ 
lending standards for the period before (2002:Q4-2008:Q3), during (2008:Q4-2010Q4) and 
after (2011:Q1-2014Q4) the financial crisis, which should be a sufficient duration of time 
considering the fact that an entire cycle of monetary policy is encompassed during these 
periods. In this case it is necessary to sample the aforementioned periods for the following 
reasons.  
The present analysis will first be cut off in 2008:Q3; this point in time serves as a suitable 
closing window for the pre-crisis time frame, and considers the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
which occurred on September 15, 2008, in addition to the initiation of the execution of non-
standard monetary measures by the ECB. Next this paper submits an expanded analysis of the 
GFC duration until the final quarter in 2010, in which the Eurosystem instigated non-standard 
measures of liquidity provision to the EA banking segment. Lastly, the post-crisis sample 
                                                          
9 In the case that foreign banks are included in the sample, the bank lending standards concern the credit policy 
executed within the national market. 
10 A comprehensive description of the BLS setup was outlined in Berg et al. (2005). Furthermore, Hempell & 
Sørensen (2010) document an updated account of the BLS results until July 2009.    
11 These include a number of nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain) that introduced the Euro on January 1, 1999.  We exclude Austria, Finland and Ireland due 
to lack of available data. 
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corresponds to the allotment of the two-three year (LTROs) in 2011 and 2012; as a result it 
terminates in the final quarter of 2014. Additionally, the methodology implemented in this case 
to delineate the period sampled corroborates the methodologies accepted in Maddaloni and 
Peydro (2011/2013) which analyse survey data tailored to the U.S and the EA.  
3.2 Macroeconomic and financial indicators 
The macro and financial indicators involved in our primary investigation are short-term interest 
rates rates, long term interest rates (10 year government bond), Taylor rule residuals, GDP 
growth rate and inflation rates. Here it is noteworthy to clarify that for monetary policy, 
quarterly average of overnight rates (EONIA) are utilised. The effects of long term interest 
rates are assessed, since mortgage loans and consumer credits have extended maturity; 
consequently the credit standards are influenced to a smaller degree by short-term interest rates. 
Also, monetary conditions are computed by the Taylor rule residuals (see Taylor, 2009) 
achieved through regressing the EONIA on both GDP growth rate and inflation rates. The 
residuals corresponding to each nation chosen for our selection are estimated with panel least 
squares regressions, thereby applying shared coefficients for all 9 countries, considering the 
shared monetary policy. A negative (positive) Taylor rule residual from a given moment in 
time represents an expansionary (contractionary) monetary policy.12  
Figure 1-3 illustrates that the credit standards for business, mortgage and consumer loans 
exhibited an analogous configuration, particularly mid- (2008:Q4-2010:Q4) and post- 
(2011:Q1-2014:Q4) financial crisis samples; at this point it is worthwhile to note that business 
loans underwent the greatest tightening of credit standards relative to both mortgage and 
consumer loans. The demand for loans underwent moderate growth in the pre-crisis sample 
(2002:Q4-2008:Q3), throughout the three classes of loans, whereas there was a significant 
decrease during the crisis time frame with this decline particularly prominent for mortgage 
loans.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Appendices I-III report the descriptive statistics. 
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Figure. 1 Credit Standards and Demand for Business Loans in EA9 Countries 
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Figure. 2 Credit Standards and Demand for Mortgage Loans in EA9 Countries 
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Figure. 3 Credit Standards and Demand for Consumer Loans in EA9 Countries 
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As shown in Figure. 4, substantial discrepancy exists regarding the number of times with 
protraction of low Taylor-rule residuals. Most notably the Taylor rule residuals remained negative 
for 21 consecutive quarters from 2009:Q4 to 2014:Q4, suggesting the scale of expansionary 
monetary policy undertaken in this region; this is similar to that seen in EONIA, especially over 
the course of this time span.  
Notes: Figure 4 compares the Taylor-rule residuals and the Eonia rates in the EA9 countries. Taylor-
rule residuals presented are the residuals of the regressions of EONIA rates on the growth rate of GDP 
and inflation rate over the period spanning from 2002:Q4-2014:Q4. Here the residuals are determined 
individually for every member of the EA9, and subsequently a weighted mean is determined utilising 
each nation’s GDP.  The residuals are estimated for 9 EA countries comprising Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
3.3 Model specification 
Considering that the issues addressed in the study are contingent on banks’ credit standards and 
monetary policy stance in the EA, the disturbance of the model is expected to be in violation of 
traditional assumptions, specifically to be vulnerable to heteroscedasticity as well as being correlated 
throughout the nations selected for this research. The methodology used to tackle this here is 
analogous to that employed in Maddaloni and Peydro (2011).  In the first part of this present study, 
the results are collected using generalised panel least squares (GLS) panel regressions methodology, 
largely considered to be a more efficient approach as indicated in Wooldridge (2007). GLS permits 
the inclusion of the estimates of the variance and the covariance of the residuals in the EA9 sample. 
Additionally, it permits the imposition of a parametric structure with the purpose of amending the 
residuals for autocorrelation. Furthermore, country fixed effects are accounted for in order to guard 
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against any unseen variation occurring within banking structure of sampled countries in this present 
research. Given that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is found to be significant when 
analysing the outcomes outlined in Table 1-3, GLS estimation methodology could be biased while 
considering fixed effects. Accordingly, the GMM estimator is employed for the majority of 
outstanding regressions, which is supported by Arellano and Bond (1991), and additionally expanded 
upon in Blundell and Bond (1998) which utilise lags of the dependent variable as instruments. Using 
this method alleviates the endogeneity issues if the instruments are not correlated with the variables 
in question. Consequently, the Arellano and Bond system estimator with Windmeijer (2005) 
corrected coefficient standard errors is employed here. 
It is important to mention that the BLS data is completely stable for the EA given that the monetary 
policy stance is common throughout the countries presented in our study. Accordingly, while 
evaluating the EA9 nations utilising the BLS results, the first section focuses on the period pre- 
(2002:Q4 -2008:Q3), mid- (2008:Q4-2010:Q4) and post- (2011:Q1-2014:Q4) financial crisis. 
Our empirical methodology relies on a sequence of panel regressions which have baselines of the 
functional form as follows (1): 
Lending conditions t,i= 𝛼i+ 𝛽𝑆𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠t-1, i+𝛾𝐿𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠t-1,i +𝜆 Taylor-rule residualst-1,i+𝜃GDPgrowtht-
1,i+𝛿Infalion ratet-1, i+𝜌𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 t-1, i+ Lending conditions t-1,i+ 𝜀i,t   
Where Lending conditions t,i are indicative of the methods of lending conditions driven directly from 
the BLS at time t for country i (expressed in net percentage terms). SRatet-1, i and 𝐿𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠t-1 denote 
short and long term interest rates, respectively. Taylor-rule residuals are the Taylor-rule residuals of 
the regression of EONIA rates on GDP growth and inflation, both of which are included as 
macroeconomics variables. Finally Demandt-1, I, represents the demand for loans. In order to consider 
the endogeneity bias, each explanatory variable is lagged by one quarter denoted by t-1. Within this 
present research involving the financial crisis and post-crisis times, additional variables are 
represented originating directing from the BLS.  
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4. Results 
Tables 1-3 thoroughly examine the effects of monetary conditions on overall lending standards as 
applied to approval of loans or credit lines specific for business, mortgage and consumer in EA9 
countries during the periods including  pre- (2002:Q4-2008:Q3), mid- (2008:Q4-2010:Q4) and 
post- (2011:Q1-2014:Q4) financial crisis. At this point it is prudent to refer to Question 1 and 8 
described within the BLS (see Appendix IV for a detailed illustration of the survey). The monetary 
conditions employed in this research include Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA) and Taylor-
rule residuals. Additionally, country fixed effects are considered in order to guard against unseen 
variation within the banking structure of the designated selection of countries in this present 
research.  
When analysing columns 1-5 illustrated in Tables 1-3, the dependant variable is described through 
using total lending standards calculated using the net percentage of banks detailing tighter credit 
standards for loans to enterprises during the preceding quarter. Next, country fixed effects are 
added and macroeconomic variables are included. Columns 1-3 report the outcome when 
regressing the total lending standards on EONIA. In columns 4-5, EONIA is substituted with 
Taylor-rule residuals and include macroeconomic variables every designated column. Columns 6-
10 show a repetition of the same groups of regressions for total lending standards; however they 
correspond to households for house purchase. Lastly, columns 11-15 are specific for total lending 
standards to consumer credit and other lending.   
The following section details an analytical evaluation by conducting a thorough review of the 
effects of monetary conditions on total lending standards regarding the previously mentioned three 
categories of loans for the periods pre-, mid- and post-financial crisis in Tables 1-3.  Our 
coefficient corresponding to EONIA exhibits a comparable configuration throughout the various 
specifications in the pre-crisis sample, being statistically significant at 1% in most cases, although 
marginally decreasing following the incorporation of further variables; this is a result of 
macroeconomic factors or country fixed effects, developing to 11.00*** in the foremost 
challenging specification in column 2 for business loans. The value of the coefficient of EONIA 
demonstrates a greater effect of short-term interest rates on total lending standards for loans to 
enterprises relative to both mortgage and consumer loans; this indicates a creditable hypothesis 
amid phases of too low levels of monetary policy stance preceding the beginning of the financial 
crisis as well as a disproportionate softening of total lending standards by banks as applied to 
approval of loans or credit lines.   
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During the crisis the coefficient for EONIA underwent an additional decline for all three types of 
loans, as they were hit badly during this time frame. Considering that EONIA experienced a 
substantial reduction, our estimation suggests that the decrease in the level of short-term interest 
rates has failed to manifest as a further softening of bank’s credit standards as applied to approval 
loans relative to the selection sample pre-crisis. 
Certainly this has applied to the post-crisis sample, in which monetary policy makers reacted to 
the GFC by slashing interest rates to levels approaching zero then maintaining those values for a 
record duration of time in order to facilitate bank lending activity. With respect to such conditions, 
Keynes (1936) describes monetary policy as analogous to ‘pushing on a string’ and additionally 
posits the concept of a ‘liquidity trap’. Our estimation proposes that softening of total lending 
standards for consumer loans has been less enhanced from the short-term interest rates reduction. 
However, it is noteworthy to state that the effect of short-term interest rates on total lending 
standards for loans to household for house purchase was marginally enhanced in comparison to 
the model tailored to the crisis period selection.  
While substituting EONIA with Taylor-rule residuals, our estimation upholds the previous results 
obtained by the EONIA particularly in the pre- and post-crisis periods. Yet there is some 
discrepancy, since the results indicate that negative residuals lead only to a softening of total 
lending standards for business loans in the post-crisis time frame. At this point it is noteworthy to 
mention that the coefficient for the growth rate of GDP is negative, yet it stays positive for inflation 
rate. The results indicate that higher rates of GDP growth are associated with the softening of total 
lending standards, most specifically in the pre-crisis sample, which supports the justification 
offered in Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) which argue that banks’ credit standards are ‘pro-
cyclical’. This present estimation additionally indicates that an increase in the inflation rate confers 
a constriction of total lending standards, which may soon come as a result of predicted rises in 
monetary policy rates (these coefficients generally stay statistically significant throughout various 
specifications and maintain a positive value, which is detailed in Tables 1-3).  
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Table. 1 Short term monetary policy stance and the lending standards prior to the financial crisis (2002:Q4-2008:Q3) 
Table 1 illustrates the outcome from the GLS panel regressions in which the dependant variable is specified via total lending standards, estimated through the net percentage from banks from every 
one of the nations belonging to the EA9 which describes tightening of credit standards when considering the preceding quarter. The net percentages documented within the Bank Lending Survey 
(BLS) for EA9 countries reflect the approval of loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS, which are as follows: enterprises, households and consumer credits. Responses to Question 
1 and 8 are outlined in the BLS (see Appendix IV for a detailed explanation of the questions posed in the survey). The overnight rates is defined here by  the quarterly average of the daily overnight 
rates (EONIA), the growth rates of GDP are characterised by the annual growth rates of real GDP specific for every one of the nations and inflation rates are denoted by the quarterly average of 
inflation rates, again, specific to each nation. The Taylor residuals are characterised as the residuals of the regression of EONIA rates on both the growth rates of GDP and inflation rates encompassing 
the time frame prior to the financial crisis (2002:Q4-2008Q3). Note that each explanatory variables utilised in this case is lagged by one quarter. We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 
9 Euro-area nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We estimate the panel regression over the pre-crisis period from 2002:Q4-2008:Q3. 
The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively and reported in the brackets.   
 
       EA9 Countries       
   Business Loans     Mortgage Loans     Consumer Loans   
 Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards 
    
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Overnight rates t-1 
10.69 11.00 11.12   4.28 5.17 6.20   3.55 3.86 4.56   
  (7.09)*** (7.43)*** (6.83)***   (3.18)** (3.81)*** (4.31)***   (2.71)** (3.08)** (3.42)***   
Taylor rule residuals t-1 
   10.77 11.12    4.48 6.20    3.39 4.56 
     (6.92)*** (6.83)***    (3.22)** (4.31)***    (2.50)* (3.42)*** 
GDP growth rate t-1 
  -0.46 0.89 1.10   -1.72 0.16 -0.86   -1.46 0.17 -0.83 
    (0.52) (1.33) (1.32)   (2.16)* (0.24) (1.12)   (2.07)* (0.29) (1.20) 
Inflation rate t-1 
  3.25 7.80 7.81   -1.76 1.67 0.80   -1.01 2.39 0.86 
    (1.95) (5.31)*** (4.71)***   (1.21) (1.36) (0.56)   (0.75) (2.00)* (0.67) 
Lagged Dependent t-1 0.66 0.63 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.66 0.53 0.49 0.65 0.49 0.61 0.52 0.48 0.60 0.48 
 (16.07)*** (15.04)*** (11.83)*** (12.74)*** (11.83)*** (13.51)*** (9.55)*** (8.35)*** (12.65)*** (8.35)*** (12.65)*** (9.90)*** (8.75)*** (11.81)*** (8.75)*** 
Country  
     Fixed effect 
no yes yes no yes no yes yes no yes no yes yes no yes 
No of  
      observations 
215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Wald  
       Statistics 
500.15*** 527.92*** 506.60*** 484.49*** 506.60*** 224.86*** 250.40*** 262.14*** 224.52*** 262.14*** 188.11*** 211.47*** 216.02*** 187.40*** 216.02*** 
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Table. 2 Short term monetary policy stance and the lending standards during the financial crisis (2008Q4-2010:Q4) 
Table 2 illustrates the outcome from the GLS panel regressions in which the dependant variable is specified via total lending standards, estimated through the net percentage from banks from every 
one of the nations belonging to the EA9 which describes tightening of credit standards when considering the preceding quarter. The net percentages documented within the Bank Lending Survey 
(BLS) for EA9 countries reflect the approval of loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS, which are as follows: enterprises, households and consumer credits. Responses to Question 
1 and 8 are outlined in the BLS (see Appendix IV for a detailed explanation of the questions posed in the survey). The overnight rates is defined here by  the quarterly average of the daily overnight 
rates (EONIA), the growth rates of GDP are characterised by the annual growth rates of real GDP specific for every one of the nations and inflation rates are denoted by the quarterly average of 
inflation rates, again, specific to each nation. The Taylor residuals are characterised as the residuals of the regression of EONIA rates on both the growth rates of GDP and inflation rates encompassing 
the time frame during the financial crisis (2008:Q4-2010Q4). Note that each explanatory variables utilised in this case is lagged by one quarter. We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 
9 Euro-area nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We estimate the panel regression over the crisis period from 2008:Q4-2010:Q4. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively and reported in the brackets.  
 
       EA9 Countries       
   Business Loans     Mortgage Loans     Consumer Loans   
 Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards 
    
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Overnight rates t-1 
4.54 6.80 3.66   2.48 4.34 3.05   -0.98 1.45 1.53   
  (1.39) (2.21)* (1.21)   (1.13) (2.45)* (1.27)   (0.43) (0.88) (0.71)   
Taylor rule residuals t-1 
   1.61 3.67    1.13 3.05    -2.68 1.54 
     (0.49) (1.21)    (0.44) (1.27)    (1.06) (0.71) 
GDP growth rate t-1   0.33 -0.18 0.85   0.29 0.39 0.72   -0.01 -1.09 0.22 
    (0.43) (0.18) (0.89)   (0.48) (0.46) (0.88)   (0.00) (1.43) (0.27) 
Inflation rate t-1 
  4.17 7.27 5.67   1.79 3.03 3.03   0.36 2.73 0.99 
    (2.05)* (2.96)** (2.67)**   (1.00) (1.77) (2.04)*   (0.20) (1.49) (0.62) 
Lagged Dependent t-1 0.34 0.24 0.22 0.29 0.22 0.61 0.49 0.51 0.64 0.51 0.51 0.32 0.27 0.49 0.27 
 (3.28)** (2.40)* (2.03)* (2.63)** (2.03)* (6.50)*** (5.04)*** (4.89)*** (6.69)*** (4.89)*** (4.87)*** (2.86)** (2.39)* (4.60)*** (2.39)* 
Country  
     Fixed effect 
no yes yes no yes no yes yes no yes no yes yes no yes 
No of  
      observations 
80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Wald  
       Statistics 
25.74*** 74.05*** 72.14*** 33.31*** 72.14*** 54.92*** 87.14*** 85.36*** 60.82*** 85.39*** 25.19*** 76.21*** 60.69*** 29.49*** 60.73*** 
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Table. 3 Short term monetary policy stance and the lending standards after the financial crisis (2011:Q1-2014:Q4) 
Table 3 illustrates the outcome from the GLS panel regressions in which the dependant variable is specified via total lending standards, estimated through the net percentage from banks from every 
one of the nations belonging to the EA9 which describes tightening of credit standards when considering the preceding quarter. The net percentages documented within the Bank Lending Survey 
(BLS) for EA9 countries reflect the approval of loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS, which are as follows: enterprises, households and consumer credits. Responses to Question 
1 and 8 are outlined in the BLS (see Appendix IV for a detailed explanation of the questions posed in the survey). The overnight rates is defined here by  the quarterly average of the daily overnight 
rates (EONIA), the growth rates of GDP are characterised by the annual growth rates of real GDP specific for every one of the nations and inflation rates are denoted by the quarterly average of 
inflation rates, again, specific to each nation. The Taylor residuals are characterised as the residuals of the regression of EONIA rates on both the growth rates of GDP and inflation rates encompassing 
the time frame after the financial crisis (2011:Q1-2014Q4). Note that each explanatory variables utilised in this case is lagged by one quarter. We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 9 
Euro-area nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We estimate the panel regression over the post-crisis period from 2011:Q1-2014:Q4. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively and reported in the brackets.  
       EA9 Countries       
   Business Loans     Mortgage Loans     Consumer Loans   
 Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards 
    
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Overnight rates t-1 
6.00 6.99 1.69   7.65 8.21 1.22   3.28 4.97 -3.58   
  (2.29)* (2.80)** (0.41)   (2.30)* (2.70)** (0.25)   (1.31) (2.23)* (0.94)   
Taylor rule residuals t-1 
   7.70 1.69    6.87 1.22    2.57 -3.58 
     (2.30)* (0.41)    (1.64) (0.25)    (0.77) (0.94) 
GDP growth rate t-1 
  0.33 0.25 0.57   0.34 -0.04 0.51   1.28 0.09 0.78 
    (0.47) (0.47) (1.00)   (0.38) (0.06) (0.77)   (1.87) (0.19) (1.59) 
Inflation rate t-1 
  2.88 3.21 3.58   3.86 4.44 4.36   3.63 1.77 2.16 
    (2.08)* (2.83)** (3.13)**   (2.44)* (3.21)** (3.23)**   (2.95)** (1.63) (2.14)* 
Lagged Dependent t-1 0.61 0.49 0.41 0.55 0.41 0.46 0.37 0.34 0.39 0.34 0.52 0.35 0.32 0.49 0.32 
 (9.77)*** (6.90)*** (4.81)*** (7.19)*** (4.81)*** (6.09)*** (4.83)*** (3.89)*** (4.66)*** (3.89)*** (7.00)*** (4.36)*** (3.68)*** (6.03)*** (3.68)*** 
Country  
     Fixed effect 
no yes yes no yes no yes yes no yes no yes yes no yes 
No of  
      observations 
143 143 142 142 142 143 143 142 142 142 143 143 142 142 142 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Wald  
       Statistics 
110.16*** 133.68*** 145.89*** 120.26*** 145.89*** 51.95*** 69.15*** 93.80*** 68.23*** 93.80*** 56.50*** 85.78*** 101.78*** 60.16*** 101.78*** 
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Tables 4-6 document that the aforementioned results (Tables 1-3) remain the same after  including 
further variables such as changes in demand for loans and 10-year government bond rates. Our 
results support the idea that a reduced monetary policy stance characterised by Taylor rule residuals 
lead to less harsh total lending standards. Such a dynamic is especially seen in total lending 
standards while revealing the elements specific to the banks’ balance sheets for all three types of 
loans pre-crisis.  
In addition, by examining loan demand detailed in approximations 1-8 (see Tables 4-6), it can be 
inferred that this variable has a substantial effect on total lending standards. It is statistically 
significant in a number of cases and has conceivable negative coefficients; this is explained using 
the rationale that an increase in net percentage of banks recording a rise in demand for loans while 
being associated with an additional loosening of total lending standards by banks. This is supported 
by traditional loan demand research that states that the elasticity of the scale factor, representing 
financing requirements, is calculated utilising economic components, such as GDP growth rates 
and inflation rate, for example. 
In addition, 10-year government bond rates are mostly not quantified as statistically significant, 
highlighting the fact that lending standards are not affected by long-term national interest rates 
prevalent mainly in the pre-crisis sample. Our results support the previous finding by Maddloni & 
Peydro (2013) while indicating that monetary policy stance influences the total lending standards 
regarding variations in bank net worth resulting from different levels of banks’ liquidity and capital 
position prior to the financial crisis.13  
Here it is worthwhile to note the scale of the expansionary monetary policy during and after the 
financial crisis, in a period of low policy rates, which saw 21 successive  quarters in which the 
Taylor rule residuals stayed negative from  2009:Q4 to 2014:Q4 as depicted in Figure. 4. The data 
indicates a significant reduction in the effect of short-term interest rates concerning their ability to 
lower banks’ total credit standards, while the demand for loan remained relatively unchanged 
specifically during the crisis period. Of particular note is that despite the labours of the ECB to 
keep interest rates low and inject liquidity into banking systems, banks’ lending standards remain 
subdued, as documented in the selection of EA9 countries. Such a conclusion is corroborated by 
the crucial analysis of the Japanese economy in Werner (2012) which stresses that continuous 
short-term interest rate reductions for a period spanning over a decade were ineffective at 
stimulating the economy and expanding the money supply. 
                                                          
13 This also applies to bank’s market financing for business loans and the total lending standards from balance sheet 
factors concerning both mortgage and consumer loans. 
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Table 4 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified via total lending standards, estimated through the net percentage from banks from 
every one of the nations belonging to the EA9 which describes tightening of credit standards when considering the preceding quarter. Responses to Question 1 and 8 are outlined in the BLS 
presented in column 1-3. . Similarly, the dependant variable described by total lending standards due to balance sheet factors noted in columns (4-8) is measured by the net percentage of banks 
reporting a tightening of credit standards as a result of cost of funds and balance sheet constraints comprising three components which are as follows: cost related to the bank’s capital position, 
bank’s ability to access market financing and bank’s liquidity position. These are specific for business loans, and all factors related to balance sheet constraints for both mortgage and consumer 
loans.  Additionally, these are solutions to Questions 2, 9 and 11 detailed within the BLS. The Taylor residuals are characterised as the residuals of the regression of EONIA rates on both the 
growth rates of GDP and inflation rates encompassing the time frame prior to the financial crisis (2002:Q4-2008Q3). Additionally the demand for loans is represented via the net percentage of 
banks documenting a rise in demand regarding business, mortgage and consumer loans (Question 4 and 13 in the BLS). Long term national government bond rate is denoted by the 10-year bond 
interest rate for every nation. Inflation is measured the quarterly average of inflation rates for each country and the growth rate of GDP is represented in the real GDP yearly growth rate denoted 
in each country. Note that each explanatory variables utilised in this case is lagged by one quarter.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively and reported in the brackets.  Stata 12 was employed in order to obtain results regarding the GMM method through ‘Xtabond 2’ requirement as highlighted by Roodman (2009).
Table. 4 The effect of monetary policy on bank’s credit standards prior to the crisis (2002:Q4-2008:Q3) 
                Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards from Balance Sheet Factors 
  Business Loans Mortgage  Loans Consumer Loans 
  Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Loans 
Bank's 
Capital Position 
Bank's 
Market Financing 
Bank's 
Liquidity Position All Factors All Factors 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 
10.24 7.12 5.55 3.64 7.21 4.89 4.22 3.98 
 
(4.00)*** (2.37)* (2.19)* (3.63)*** (3.87)*** (5.04)*** (2.00)* (2.15)* 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 
-0.02 -0.03 -0.16 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.06 
 
(0.24) (0.71) (2.25)* (1.12) (1.00) (0.76) (2.11)* (1.68) 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 
7.27 0.81 2.12 2.27 -2.06 3.75 -0.38 5.86 
 
(1.74) (0.24) (0.68) (1.31) (0.66) (1.50) (0.23) (2.93)** 
Inflation rate i, t-1 
8.99 -0.07 5.64 2.87 5.09 6.23 -2.15 3.90 
 
(3.26)** (0.06) (1.61) (2.68)** (2.06)* (2.97)** (1.33) (2.88)** 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 
2.06 -0.46 0.43 0.29 2.40 1.57 -0.38 -1.60 
 
(2.59)** (0.45) (0.39) (0.51) (1.90) (2.63)** (0.77) (2.45)* 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 
0.53 0.47 0.52 0.49 0.58 0.28 0.51 0.64 
 
(6.64)*** (3.71)*** (7.50)*** (11.91)*** (5.81)*** (2.04)* (9.86)*** (26.41)*** 
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No of observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
p(Sargan) 0.709 0.202 0.548 0.216 0.115 0.238 0.150 0.086 
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Table 5 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified via total lending standards, estimated through the net percentage from banks from 
every one of the nations belonging to the EA9 which describes tightening of credit standards when considering the preceding quarter. Responses to Question 1 and 8 are outlined in the BLS 
presented in column 1-3. . Similarly, the dependant variable described by total lending standards due to balance sheet factors noted in columns (4-8) is measured by the net percentage of banks 
reporting a tightening of credit standards as a result of cost of funds and balance sheet constraints comprising three components which are as follows: cost related to the bank’s capital position, 
bank’s ability to access market financing and bank’s liquidity position. These are specific for business loans, and all factors related to balance sheet constraints for both mortgage and consumer 
loans.  Additionally, these are solutions to Questions 2, 9 and 11 detailed within the BLS. The Taylor residuals are characterised as the residuals of the regression of EONIA rates on both the 
growth rates of GDP and inflation rates encompassing the time frame during the financial crisis (2008:Q4-2010Q4. Additionally the demand for loans is represented via the net percentage of 
banks documenting a rise in demand regarding business, mortgage and consumer loans (Question 4 and 13 in the BLS). Long term national government bond rate is denoted by the 10-year bond 
interest rate for every nation. Inflation is measured the quarterly average of inflation rates for each country and the growth rate of GDP is represented in the real GDP yearly growth rate denoted 
in each country. Note that each explanatory variables utilised in this case is lagged by one quarter.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively and reported in the brackets.  Stata 12 was employed in order to obtain results regarding the GMM method through ‘Xtabond 2’ requirement as highlighted by Roodman (2009).
Table. 5 The effect of monetary policy on bank’s credit standards during the crisis (2008:Q4-2010:Q4) 
                Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards from Balance Sheet Factors 
  Business Loans Mortgage  Loans Consumer Loans 
  Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Loans 
Bank's 
Capital Position 
Bank's 
Market Financing 
Bank's 
Liquidity Position All Factors All Factors 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 
6.96 0.34 9.37 5.40 8.54 4.82 -3.30 5.74 
 
(1.68) (0.10) (1.79) (1.38) (1.83) (0.60) (1.76) (0.73) 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 
0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.09 -0.28 0.00 -0.24 0.06 
 
(0.14) (1.04) (0.28) (1.65) (3.63)*** (0.03) (2.39)* (0.41) 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 
10.15 2.92 11.74 8.25 11.14 10.68 3.65 10.77 
 
(1.54) (0.98) (2.66)** (3.25)** (2.21)* (1.23) (0.92) (2.61)*** 
Inflation rate i, t-1 
-2.42 0.13 -5.11 -2.84 -5.54 -5.72 -6.48 -6.47 
 
(1.00) (0.04) (2.19)* (1.48) (3.08)** (1.81) (3.14)** (3.05)** 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 
5.82 1.49 5.27 2.57 3.84 5.90 1.79 5.61 
 
(3.42)*** (1.09) (2.10)* (1.95) (1.42) (1.49) (0.97) (1.76) 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 
0.52 0.51 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.54 0.37 0.37 
 
(3.14)** (8.89)*** (2.43)* (2.31)* (2.63)** (3.39)*** (2.56)* (2.03)* 
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No of observations 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
p(Sargan) 0.708 0.225 0.892 0.119 0.241 0.161 0.137 0.919 
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Table 6 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified via total lending standards, estimated through the net percentage from banks from 
every one of the nations belonging to the EA9 which describes tightening of credit standards when considering the preceding quarter. Responses to Question 1 and 8 are outlined in the BLS 
presented in column 1-3. . Similarly, the dependant variable described by total lending standards due to balance sheet factors noted in columns (4-8) is measured by the net percentage of banks 
reporting a tightening of credit standards as a result of cost of funds and balance sheet constraints comprising three components which are as follows: cost related to the bank’s capital position, 
bank’s ability to access market financing and bank’s liquidity position. These are specific for business loans, and all factors related to balance sheet constraints for both mortgage and consumer 
loans.  Additionally, these are solutions to Questions 2, 9 and 11 detailed within the BLS. The Taylor residuals are characterised as the residuals of the regression of EONIA rates on both the 
growth rates of GDP and inflation rates encompassing the time frame after the financial crisis (2011:Q1-2014Q4). Additionally the demand for loans is represented via the net percentage of banks 
documenting a rise in demand regarding business, mortgage and consumer loans (Question 4 and 13 in the BLS). Long term national government bond rate is denoted by the 10-year bond interest 
rate for every nation. Inflation is measured the quarterly average of inflation rates for each country and the growth rate of GDP is represented in the real GDP yearly growth rate denoted in each 
country. Note that each explanatory variables utilised in this case is lagged by one quarter.  The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively and reported in the brackets.  Stata 12 was employed in order to obtain results regarding the GMM method through ‘Xtabond 2’ requirement as highlighted by Roodman (2009).
Table. 6  The effect of monetary policy on bank’s credit standards after the crisis (2011:Q1-2014:Q4) 
                Total Lending Standards Total Lending Standards from Balance Sheet Factors 
  Business Loans Mortgage  Loans Consumer Loans 
  Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Loans 
Bank's 
Capital Position 
Bank's 
Market Financing 
Bank's 
Liquidity Position All Factors All Factors 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 
12.02 8.92 6.66 -1.60 9.89 16.40 11.74 6.90 
 
(2.40)* (1.43) (1.21) (0.26) (1.69) (2.27)* (1.63) (0.91) 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 
-0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.12 -0.14 
 
(2.65)** (0.51) (0.15) (1.13) (0.32) (1.33) (1.51) (2.40)* 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 
0.29 -0.81 0.61 1.64 2.02 1.76 -0.36 -0.19 
 
(0.51) (1.31) (0.98) (6.58)*** (3.01)** (2.50)* (1.41) (0.38) 
Inflation rate i, t-1 
5.21 8.55 7.99 0.59 0.88 12.69 3.41 1.59 
 
(3.44)*** (3.62)*** (2.48)* (0.64) (0.49) (4.88)*** (1.19) (0.64) 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 
2.74 1.73 3.28 1.49 3.41 7.56 1.12 2.61 
 
(2.93)** (1.13) (1.75) (1.25) (2.00)* (2.89)** (0.90) (2.35)* 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 
0.51 0.31 0.38 0.62 0.60 0.36 0.50 0.71 
 
(4.75)*** (2.24)* (1.96) (4.86)*** (11.45)*** (6.00)*** (4.24)*** (7.13)*** 
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes 
No of observations 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
p(Sargan) 0.118 0.176 0.366 0.234 0.220 0.839 0.225 0.224 
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Tables 7 and 8 highlight the outcomes of the regressions where the dependent variables are 
categorised as banks’ conditions and terms regarding authorising loans or credit lines in 
conjunction with the aforementioned types of loans designed precisely for the time frame prior to 
and also following the financial turmoil. 
Of particular note is that low short-term monetary policy rates exert a substantial softening effect 
on margins (lending rates) specific for both average and riskier loans in each of the three loan 
categories with the most significant effect observed in consumer credit and other lending. 
Consequently, this implies that prior to the beginning to the crisis, characterised by reduced 
monetary rates, banks relaxed margins on loans, a practice which unexpectedly included 
borrowers that were perceived as riskier; however, the post-financial crisis period reduced the 
effectiveness of low short-term policy rates, especially concerning the margin on riskier loans to 
enterprises and consumer credit. The aforementioned conclusions are supported by the findings in 
Rajan (2006), and Borio and Zhu (2012) clarifying and justifying the risk-taking approach in an 
environment of low interest rates. 
The policy rates have an additional significant softening impact on the size of the loans or credit 
line, collateral requirements and maturity for enterprises loans.  Furthermore, the low policy stance 
influence collateral requirements and loan to value ratio (LTV ratio) specifically concerning 
mortgage loans, and ultimately effects collateral requirements for consumer credit and other 
lending. The results support that increased credit risk is assumed by banks when approving and 
issuing new loans during periods of low monetary policy rates, especially prior to the onset of the 
crisis within the selection in question.  
Accordingly, the post-crisis outcomes imply that negative Taylor-rule residuals have an additional 
effect on the size of loans and maturity for enterprises loans, a possible result of the scope of 
expansionary monetary policy carried out within the EA. Moreover, it has increased the maturity 
of loans for mortgage loans and has additionally exerted an effect on collateral requirements and 
non-interest charges for approving consumer credit and other lending to households. 
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Table 7 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified through the net percentage from banks from every one of the nations belonging to the EA9, 
reporting a tightening of the terms and conditions for approving loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS, which are as follows: enterprises (columns 1–7), households (columns 8–13) and 
consumer credits (columns 14–18), while factoring the preceding quarter.  There are the responses to Question 3, 10 and 12 as outlined in the BLS.  We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 9 
Euro-area nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We estimate the panel regression over the pre-crisis period from 2002:Q3-2008:Q3. The symbols 
***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively and reported in the brackets. 
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Table. 7 Pre Crisis Results   
 Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Credit & Other Lending 
 Margin 
 on 
Average 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Non-
interest 
Rates 
Charges 
Size of 
Loan or/ 
Credit line 
Collateral 
requirements 
Loan  
covenants 
Maturity Margin 
on 
Average 
Loans 
Margin 
on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Collateral 
requirements 
“Loan-to-
value” 
ratio 
Maturity Non-
interest 
rates 
Charges 
Margin  
on 
Average 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Collateral 
requirements 
Maturity Non-
interest 
rates 
Charges 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 14.21 7.06 0.36 4.58 6.69 4.11 6.74 7.83 6.09 2.42 5.34 0.44 4.74 8.65 5.71 3.71 0.94 -0.74 
 
(2.86)** (2.32)* (0.19) (2.27)* (2.28)* (1.50) (2.39)* (2.75)** (2.45)* (2.04)* (2.40)* (0.14) (2.01)* (5.36)*** (3.81)*** (2.09)* (0.46) (0.34) 
 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.13 
 
0.05 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.03 
 
0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
(0.66) (1.54) (0.81) (1.48) (1.06) (0.53) (1.34) (1.53) (2.00)* (1.35) (3.31)*** (2.80)** (1.74) (1.00) (2.18)* (0.61) (0.22) (0.63) 
 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 
 
13.89 
 
13.55 
 
9.72 
 
6.87 
 
4.25 
 
7.49 
 
8.13 
 
9.25 
 
5.66 
 
1.61 
 
1.34 
 
2.34 
 
10.36 
 
6.06 
 
7.23 
 
3.79 
 
5.50 
 
5.57 
 
(2.02)* (2.82)** (2.96)** (2.00)* (1.01) (1.97)* (2.17)* (1.79) (1.49) (0.80) (0.51) (0.94) (2.25)* (1.64) (1.94) (1.62) (1.55) (1.72) 
 
Inflation rate i, t-1 
 
12.17 
 
10.21 
 
1.77 
 
6.15 
 
6.24 
 
3.39 
 
4.02 
 
9.84 
 
5.29 
 
0.53 
 
2.57 
 
3.19 
 
-1.60 
 
7.28 
 
6.87 
 
1.38 
 
3.70 
 
-0.25 
 
(4.00)*** (4.10)*** (1.16) (5.35)*** (3.20)** (1.57) (1.75) (2.31)* (2.00)* (0.54) (0.85) (1.60) (0.95) (3.21)** (3.79)*** (1.50) (2.54)* (0.38) 
 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 
 
1.14 
 
0.13 
 
0.39 
 
-0.62 
 
-0.22 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.11 
 
1.54 
 
-1.47 
 
-0.58 
 
-0.84 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.43 
 
0.01 
 
-0.95 
 
-1.12 
 
-1.48 
 
0.23 
 
(0.59) (0.11) (0.39) (0.88) (0.32) (0.06) (0.12) (0.97) (1.29) (1.04) (0.80) (0.20) (0.57) (0.01) (1.15) (1.70) (1.51) (0.55) 
 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 
 
 
0.55 0.43 0.58 0.45 0.58 0.54 0.42 0.52 0.43 0.52 0.48 0.27 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.32 0.21 0.30 
  
(6.89)*** (4.67)*** (7.30)*** (8.09)*** (8.88)*** (11.20)*** (5.49)*** (4.61)*** (3.88)*** (4.44)*** (3.99)*** (4.79)*** (2.75)** (4.17)** (4.38)*** (6.75)*** (2.56)* (3.35)*** 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
p(Sargan) 0.547 0.325 0.143 0.585 0.283 0.503 0.595 0.242 0.527 0.689 0.464 0.340 0.187 0.085 0.355 0.566 0.104 0.726 
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Table 8 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified through the net percentage from banks from every one of the nations belonging to the EA9, 
reporting a tightening of the terms and conditions for approving loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS, which are as follows: enterprises (columns 1–7), households (columns 8–13) and 
consumer credits (columns 14–18), while factoring the preceding quarter.  There are the responses to Question 3, 10 and 12 as outlined in the BLS.  We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 9 
Euro-area nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We estimate the panel regression over the post-crisis period from 2011:Q1-2014:Q4. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively and reported in the brackets. 
Table. 8 Post Crisis Results 
 
  
 Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Credit & Other Lending 
 Margin 
 on 
Average 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Non-
interest 
Rates 
Charges 
Size of 
Loan or/ 
Credit line 
Collateral 
requirements 
Loan  
covenants 
Maturity Margin 
on 
Average 
Loans 
Margin 
on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Collateral 
requirements 
“Loan-to-
value” 
ratio 
Maturity Non-
interest 
rates 
Charges 
Margin 
 on 
Average 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Collateral 
requirements 
Maturity Non-
interest 
rates 
Charges 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 26.67 18.55 11.97 19.38 2.61 13.11 14.82 30.41 19.23 11.95 15.01 11.88 2.42 18.99 13.84 26.69 2.06 23.76 
 (2.54)* (1.66) (1.34) (3.00)** (0.62) (1.64) (2.88)** (3.17)** (2.28)* (1.78) (1.29) (2.43)* (0.51) (2.81)** (2.30)* (2.62)** (0.30) (5.28)*** 
 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 
 
-0.25 
 
-0.14 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.06 
 
0.02 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.26 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.23 
 (2.89)** (1.41) (1.18) (1.47) (2.50)* (0.94) (0.59) (0.31) (0.90) (0.13) (0.35) (0.83) (0.80) (6.49)*** (1.26) (0.22) (1.98)* (2.64)** 
 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 
 
-0.61 
 
0.73 
 
-0.77 
 
0.75 
 
0.11 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.01 
 
-1.39 
 
1.21 
 
1.34 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.48 
 
-0.07 
 
0.28 
 
0.42 
 
1.17 
 
-0.04 
 
-9.25 
 (0.65) (0.82) (2.05)* (2.14)* (0.51) (0.25) (0.02) (2.44)* (1.24) (1.82) (0.37) (1.67) (0.13) (0.61) (1.66) (5.51)*** (0.13) (1.32) 
 
Inflation rate i, t-1 
 
20.49 
 
19.96 
 
7.11 
 
11.60 
 
7.59 
 
9.05 
 
11.97 
 
22.14 
 
13.11 
 
5.47 
 
7.08 
 
4.58 
 
2.86 
 
6.22 
 
9.76 
 
14.13 
 
1.12 
 
9.63 
 (5.14)*** (3.65)*** (4.56)*** (3.03)** (2.24)* (3.58)*** (3.09)** (4.45)*** (2.92)** (2.34)* (2.61)** (2.76)** (2.09)* (3.01)** (3.28)** (4.54)*** (0.59) (0.41) 
 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 
 
7.07 
 
3.50 
 
2.32 
 
2.76 
 
2.32 
 
1.33 
 
3.05 
 
3.36 
 
3.69 
 
2.05 
 
0.57 
 
1.69 
 
2.03 
 
3.58 
 
2.50 
 
6.40 
 
0.70 
 
1.28 
 (2.92)** (1.58) (2.19)* (1.87) (2.00)* (1.59) (2.56)* (1.57) (1.97)* (0.99) (0.26) (1.81) (1.70) (2.41)* (1.61) (4.62)*** (0.90) (1.22) 
 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 
 
 
0.54 
 
 
0.10 
 
 
0.44 
 
 
0.42 
 
 
0.39 
 
 
0.32 
 
 
0.47 
 
 
0.34 
 
 
0.24 
 
 
0.23 
 
 
0.34 
 
 
0.48 
 
 
0.51 
 
 
0.32 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
0.32 
 
 
0.55 
 
 
0.74 
 
(6.15)*** (0.79) (4.32)*** (3.88)*** (3.71)*** (3.82)*** (7.09)** (3.53)*** (2.85)** (2.06)* (1.99)* (5.35)*** (4.05)*** (2.06)* (2.55)* (1.78) (7.49)*** (2.28)* 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
No of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
p(Sargan) 0.966 0.910 0.283 0.651 0.343 0.109 0.673 0.947 0.641 0.218 0.358 0.174 0.259 0.494 0.908 0.492 0.093 0.336 
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In Tables 9 and 10, this present investigation is further progressed by estimating twelve distinct 
regressions with the purpose of analysing the concept of ‘excessive’ risk-taking—naturally 
factoring in the stipulation that determining excessive risk is an exceedingly challenging 
undertaking, which is supported in Madaloni & Peydro (2013). The objective of this 
undertaking is to identify potential risk-taking behaviour by banks prior to and after the onset 
of recent crisis. As a result we regroup the designated nations within the original sample in line 
with both the impact and the severity of the financial crisis into two panels of A and B. Panel 
A comprises Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, whereas Panel B consists of Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands.  
We first regress banks’ margins as applied to riskier loans on Taylor-rule residuals in addition 
to further macro measurements concerning the three loan types. Then further regressions are 
conducted to control for the variations in lending conditions as a result of changes in borrowers’ 
net worth directly from the BLS and other control variables. It is important to mention that 
banks’ credit standards can be tightened due to a rise in perception of risk as a result of the 
issues outlined here: expectation regarding the economic activity, industry or firm specific 
outlook and risk on collateral demanded with reference to enterprises loans (see BLS. 
Question. 2), housing market prospects for household loans (see BLS. Question. 9) and 
creditworthiness of consumer credit and other lending (see BLS. Question. 11). 
When examining the outcome of the pre-crisis selection from stressed and non-stressed 
countries of the EA9, it can be deduced that the coefficient of Taylor-rule residuals for the 
regression utilising banks’ conditions and terms for approving loans or credit lines within the 
three categories of loans remains significant; this is especially prevalent when analysing 
stressed countries relative to non-stressed countries. The significance of the coefficient implies 
that prior to the commencement of the crisis, banks surprisingly relaxed margins for loans to 
borrowers perceived as riskier, in an environment of low monetary rates. These results uphold 
the previous findings by Jimenez et al. (2014) and Ioannidou et al. (2015). Accordingly, this 
conclusion is robust to the incorporation of the pertinent interest rates, i.e. the 10 year 
government bond rates, most specifically in the non-stressed nation prior to onset of crisis.  The 
selection in the post-crisis sample indicates a reduction in the effect of low policy rates on 
softening household and consumers loans in non-stressed nations. However, in stressed nations 
the data indicates that excessive risk-taking in bank lending behaviour occurred, particularly 
during periods of low monetary policy rates both pre- and post-crisis.
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Table 9. Before and After Crisis (Non-stressed Countries) 
Table 9 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified through the net percentage from banks from every one of the nations belonging to 
the EA9, reporting a tightening of the terms and conditions for approving loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS. We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 5 Euro-
area nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands. We estimate the panel regression over both pre and post crisis period .The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance 
levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively and reported in the brackets. 
  Before   After  
 Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Credit & Other Lending Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Credit & Other Lending 
 Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 12.42 10.62 3.15 3.46 3.28 3.62 24.53 1.11 2.61 10.77 4.74 7.87 
 (3.23)** (2.53)* (1.49) (1.70) (2.27)* (3.74)*** (2.03)* (0.07) (0.12) (0.57) (0.74) (0.75) 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 -0.16 -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 -0.07 -0.08 -0.29 -0.17 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 
 (2.05)* (1.09) (2.32)* (2.14)* (2.25)* (2.22)* (3.74)*** (1.89) (0.88) (0.45) (0.88) (0.38) 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 10.72 13.71 11.12 10.69 11.99 11.88 -4.14 0.80 -1.50 1.72 -5.35 -6.35 
 (1.76)* (1.93) (3.70)*** (2.59)** (3.64)*** (3.27)** (0.69) (0.12) (0.16) (0.20) (2.26) (2.98)** 
Inflation rate i, t-1 10.20 10.07 5.45 5.45 5.37 5.18 18.21 12.35 7.24 6.10 7.09 7.56 
 (3.34)*** (2.95)** (1.89) (1.58) (2.52)* (2.02)* (4.67)*** (1.80) (0.92) (0.80) (3.15)** (2.93)** 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 -1.30 -0.02 -3.78 -3.82 -1.57 -0.76 1.47 0.08 -2.00 -1.16 0.11 0.22 
 (0.87) (0.01) (4.31)*** (2.65)** (2.20)* (1.02) (0.92) (0.04) (0.76) (0.50) (0.10) (0.20) 
Expectations regarding general 
economic activity i, t-1  0.33  -0.17  0.24 
 
0.18 
 
0.31 
 
0.06 
  (2.66)**  (0.83)  (1.46)  (0.72)  (1.14)  (0.74) 
Industry or firm-specific outlook i, t-1  -0.09      -0.13     
  (0.61)      (0.88)     
Risk on the collateral demanded i, t-1  0.21    -0.22  -0.22    0.27 
  (1.16)    (1.11)  (0.99)    (0.69) 
Housing market prospects i, t-1    0.15      0.13   
    (1.44)      (0.61)   
Creditworthiness of consumers i, t-1      0.04      -0.19 
      (0.56)      (1.95) 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 0.34 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.27 
 (2.69)** (1.45) (2.56)* (4.47)*** (1.45) (1.64) (1.91) (1.57) (6.13)*** (5.53)*** (2.79)** (2.07)* 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 114 114 114 114 114 114 74 74 74 74 74 74 
No of countries 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
p(Sargan) 0.354 0.152 0.252 0.248 0.042 0.250 0.661 0.845 0.055 0.046 0.466 0.440 
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Table 10. Before and After Crisis (Stressed Countries) 
Table 10 illustrates the results of a GMM dynamic panel estimation in which the dependant variable is specified through the net percentage from banks from every one of the nations belonging to 
the EA9, reporting a tightening of the terms and conditions for approving loans or credit lines to three elements included in the BLS. We have a balanced panel dataset which incorporates 4 Euro-
area nations: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. We estimate the panel regression over both pre and post crisis period. The symbols ***, **, and * indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively and reported in the brackets.
  Before   After  
 Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Credit & Other Lending Business Loans Mortgage Loans Consumer Credit & Other Lending 
 Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
Margin on 
Riskier 
Loans 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Taylor rule residuals i,t-1 5.83 5.44 11.77 12.15 6.50 9.04 18.22 16.72 27.11 35.75 22.40 23.98 
 (2.77)** (2.79)** (3.37)*** (3.96)*** (2.70)** (5.60)*** (2.83)** (3.35)*** (1.75) (3.65)*** (2.07)* (2.51)* 
Demand for Loans i, t-1 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.12 -0.03 0.16 0.02 -0.07 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 
 (0.55) (0.01) (0.44) (0.15) (3.13)** (1.02) (1.94) (0.10) (0.69) (0.26) (1.07) (0.15) 
10 Year bond Rate i, t-1 10.51 7.50 4.01 5.47 4.18 1.30 1.29 1.93 1.87 -0.07 -0.15 -1.49 
 (2.50)* (1.52) (0.76) (0.99) (0.70) (0.25) (1.71) (2.14)* (2.37)* (0.06) (0.78) (2.97)** 
Inflation rate i, t-1 8.36 5.80 3.80 5.46 9.67 12.91 21.82 8.01 16.55 26.51 12.04 13.32 
 (3.25)** (2.45)* (0.82) (1.33) (4.49)*** (4.80)*** (4.58)*** (1.53) (2.62)** (5.48)*** (3.23)** (3.25)** 
GDP growth rate i, t-1 0.68 0.81 -1.12 0.08 -0.60 -0.83 5.88 5.60 7.70 4.52 1.90 1.37 
 (0.64) (0.63) (1.18) (0.05) (0.54) (0.53) (3.93)*** (4.37)*** (8.92)*** (2.99)** (1.59) (1.09) 
Expectations regarding general 
economic activity i, t-1  0.09  0.06  0.55 
 
0.51 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.26 
  (1.05)  (1.19)  (2.80)**  (1.43)  (0.38)  (1.50) 
Industry or firm-specific outlook i, t-1  -0.02      -0.37     
  (0.12)      (1.79)     
Risk on the collateral demanded i, t-1  0.22    -0.01  0.02    0.54 
  (0.91)    (0.09)  (0.06)    (2.26)* 
Housing market prospects i, t-1    -0.05      0.20   
    (0.86)      (2.44)*   
Creditworthiness of consumers i, t-1      -0.36      0.26 
      (3.31)***      (1.36) 
Lagged Dependent  i, t-1 0.53 0.42 0.59 0.48 0.45 0.14 0.16 0.41 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.01 
 (7.90)*** (3.19)** (5.67)*** (4.65)*** (4.03)*** (0.83) (0.75) (3.94)*** (0.74) (2.00)* (2.63)** (0.05) 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 64 64 64 64 64 64 
No of countries 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
p(Sargan) 0.359 0.261 0.709 0.192 0.493 0.360 0.346 0.246 0.160 0.088 0.116 0.132 
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In this section an analytical investigation of the outcomes for the BLS in EA9 is conducted, 
encompassing the period 2012Q1 to 2014Q4. The basis of this approach is to determine the 
effectiveness of the ECB’s 3 year LTROs with the purpose of learning if the measurements 
exerted the impact they were intended to. 
As illustrated by Figure. 5, banks’ credit standards for business loans were relaxed in EA9 
countries following the execution of these LTROs. In particular, this applies to the first quarter 
of 2012, in which out of the total bank participants in the survey, just 17% noted a constriction 
in the accessibility of loans or credit lines to enterprises in contrast to a significantly higher 
proportion of 36% seen in the preceding quarter. Although this measure stays constricted till 
the final quarter in 2013, it is substantially more gradual in its development than previous 
quarters. Accordingly, this progress is probably propelled through more moderate demand on 
banks stemming from the cost of funds and balance sheet constraints, reflected in Figure. 7. 
Here it can be inferred that costs related to a bank’s capital position in addition to a bank’s 
ability to access market financing show significant constrictions before 2012Q1. However, the 
ECB’s €1 trillion cheap loan scheme has achieved its anticipated impact in substantially aiding 
the relaxation of the previously mentioned issues. Furthermore, banks’ liquidity positions saw 
additional progress within the course of this period. Here it is crucial to highlight that the 
pattern of credit standards for business loans reflects further relaxation in nearly all EA9 
countries. The country analysis indicates that particularly Italy, Portugal and Greece 
experienced a marked elevation of bank credit. Net tightening of banks’ credit standards as 
applied to the approval of loans available in the two components to households for house 
purchase and consumer credit and other lending also experienced a substantial decline within 
same period. Even though the progressive decrease in bank credit constriction is reassuring and 
necessary in order to dilute the devastating impact of the latest financial turmoil, the benefits 
of such action can only be experienced in the EA9 economy with a concurrent increase in net 
demand. Correspondingly, research by Popov and Van Horen (2015) details that the reduced 
rate of lending persisted, following the ECB’s LTRO in December 2011 and these measures 
evidently failed to stop the total reduction in bank lending in the EA. 
An analysis of Figures. 6 and 8-9 indicates a substantial decline in the demand for loans to 
enterprises, households and consumer credit. Certainly the net percentage of banks announcing 
decreased demand from enterprises in EA9 fell from -6% in 2011Q4 to -42% in 2012Q4. Such 
a significant fall in demand is justified through enterprises being reluctant to invest while the 
EA crisis progressed with increasing concerns of falling into a recession; this was especially 
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the case in strained EA9 nations. However, banks’ credit demand eventually began to increase 
starting from 2013Q1 to the final quarter of 2014, which implies that the inclination of 
enterprises to invest, housing market outlook and consumer confidence are largely increasing, 
especially in the EA9 periphery countries this progress is comparable to the banks’ credit 
standards within the analogous period. 
Figure. 5 Credit Standards for Business Loans 
 
Source: (BLS, 2015) 
Figure. 6 Net Demand for Business Loans 
 
Source: (BLS, 2015) 
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Figure. 7 Factors influencing Credit standards for Business Loans 
 
Source: (BLS, 2015) 
Figure. 8 Credit Standards vs Net Demand for Mortgage Loans 
 
Source: (BLS, 2015) 
 
Figure. 9 Credit Standards vs Net Demand for Consumer Credit 
 
Source: (BLS, 2015) 
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5. Conclusion 
The recent financial turmoil has exerted a negative influence on bank lending within the 
primary industrialised nations, in addition to the EA. As a result this has brought attention to 
the issue concerning the proclivity of economic entities to take on further risk especially during 
periods of low interest rates. Moreover, when considering the practice of cautious lending in 
banks which are reluctant to intensify lending activity and volume regardless of the monetary 
policy stance, with the purpose of enabling bank lending, the ECB initiated a 3 year LTROs in 
which a combined amount of €1 trillion cheap loans was injected into the EU banking system. 
In this study, these topics are extensively examined in 9 countries of the EA. We find robust 
supporting data that low-short term interest rates prior to the crisis induced an inconsistent 
loosening of credit standards regarding enterprises, household and consumer loans. Despite the 
scope of expansionary monetary policy reported mainly in the post-crisis sample, this analysis 
indicates that negative Taylor-rule residuals resulted solely in softening of total lending 
standards for enterprises loans.  
The implementation of the 3 years LTRO by the ECB caused a decrease of the development of 
banks’ credit constriction, which is reassuring and necessary in order to avoid the likely 
damaging outcomes of the latest financial crisis. Nevertheless, the benefits of this scheme have 
yet to be experienced within the EA9 real economy considering the disadvantageous decline in 
demand for all three types of loans. However, the demand eventually began to increase in 
2013Q1 till the final quartering of 2014, indicating an encouraging inclination by enterprises 
to invest. In addition, housing market outlook and consumer confidence are starting to increase, 
which has not occurred since the commencement of credit crunch. Additionally, the recent 
TLTRO scheme implemented by the ECB is geared towards enabling increased access to cheap 
financing for SME lending.  
Especially noteworthy are the results from before the onset of the crisis, which indicate that 
banks unexpectedly relaxed margins for loans to borrowers considered as riskier, in an 
environment of low monetary rates within stressed and non-stressed nations of the sample 
investigated. Yet, in stressed nations the data suggests that excessive risk-taking in bank 
lending behaviour transpired, especially during periods of low monetary policy rates both pre- 
and post-crisis. Such recklessness should be an important issue for policy makers to note and 
should be comprehensively tackled in the formulation of future policies.  
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Appendix: I: Summary Statistics: Bank Lending Survey Indicators and Financial Indicators 
Before the Start of the Financial Crisis (2002:Q4-2008:Q3) Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs 
Lending Standards:      
Business Loans 17.75 31.28 -50 100 216 
Mortgage Loans 4.61 27.98 -66.67 100 216 
Consumer Credit Loans 6.95 24.22 -35.71 100 216 
Demand for Loans:      
Business Loans 2.89 30 -83.33 71.43 216 
Mortgage Loans 5.17 45.98 -100 100 216 
Consumer Credit Loans 6.34 30.48 -100 100 216 
Lending Standards Due to Balance Sheet Factors:      
Bank Capital Position 12.51 17.50 -25 80 216 
Bank Liquidity Position 4.25 13.37 -33.33 51.20 216 
Bank Market Financing  6.92 18.92 -40.00 100 216 
All Balance Sheet Factors for Mortgage Loans 4.96 15.30 -66.67 80 216 
All Balance Sheet Factors for Consumer Credit Loans 4.37 16.98 -33.33 100 216 
Perception of Risk:      
Expectations regarding general economic activity 23.52 33.45 -42.86 100 216 
Industry or firm-specific outlook 29.16 33.45 -28.57 100 216 
Risk on the collateral demanded 12.52 19.75 -20 80 216 
Expectations regarding general economic activity 12.83 24.20 -40 100 216 
Housing market prospects 14.80 26.59 -33.33 100 216 
Expectations regarding general economic activity 11.86 24.38 -33.33 100 216 
Creditworthiness of consumers 16.94 22.44 -25   100 216 
Risk on the collateral demanded 7.65 16.97 -33.33 80 216 
Loans terms and conditions:      
Margin on average for Business Loans 5.80 44.40 -100 100 216 
Margin on riskier Business Loans 38.73 34.61 -50 100 216 
Margin on average for Mortgage Loans -9..236 35.27 -100 100 216 
Margin on riskier for Mortgage Loans 13.43 25.48 -33.33 100 216 
Margin on average for Consumer Credit Loans -3.97 26.95 -66.67 80 216 
Margin on riskier for Consumer Credit Loans 13.54 23.13 -33.33 90 216 
Non-interest rate charges 8.55 21.17 -40 100 216 
Size of the loan or credit line 11.06 20.32 -33.33 75 216 
Collateral requirements 14.92 25.97 -46.5 100 216 
Loan covenants 10.81 21.85 -33.33 83.33 216 
Maturity 7.40 24.44 -50 80 216 
Financial factors:      
EONIA 2.84 0.82 2.02 4.25 216 
Taylor-rule Residuals 0.74 0.85 -0.99 2.46 216 
10-year Government bond rates 3.99 0.50 2.20 4.97 216 
Growth rate of GDP 2.36 1.92 -2.20 8.10 216 
Inflation rate 2.62 0.94 0.80 5.60 216 
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Appendix: II: Summary Statistics: Bank Lending Survey Indicators and Financial Indicators 
During the  Financial Crisis (2008:Q4-2010:Q4) Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs 
Lending Standards:      
Business Loans 26.06 33.16 -14.29 100 81 
Mortgage Loans 22.14 30.03 -26.4 100 81 
Consumer Credit Loans 21.37 25.78 -17 100 81 
Demand for Loans:      
Business Loans -13.64 33.23 -86 50 81 
Mortgage Loans -6.37 48.02 -100 83.5 81 
Consumer Credit Loans -19.62 31.45 -100 50 81 
Lending Standards Due to Balance Sheet Factors:      
Bank Capital Position 17.26 23.51 -25 80 81 
Bank Liquidity Position 4.09 24.68 -40 80 81 
Bank Market Financing  13.01 26.65 -40 100 81 
All Balance Sheet Factors for Mortgage Loans 12.96 24.92 -60 100 81 
All Balance Sheet Factors for Consumer Credit Loans 13.32 22.23 -25 100 81 
Financial factors:      
EONIA 0.86 0.87 0.34 3.15 81 
Taylor-rule Residuals -0.16 1.21 -2.37 2.14 81 
10-year Government bond rates 4.14 1.47 2.42 11.03 75 
Growth rate of GDP -1.37 3.66 -9.60 6.30 81 
Inflation rate 1.31 1.41 -1.50 5.60 81 
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Appendix: III: Summary Statistics: Bank Lending Survey Indicators and Financial Indicators 
After the  Financial Crisis (2011:Q1-2014:Q4) Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs 
Lending Standards:      
Business Loans 8.46 24.73 -50 100 144 
Mortgage Loans 12.78 25.12 -50 100 144 
Consumer Credit Loans 7.80 21.29 -27.5 100 144 
Demand for Loans:      
Business Loans -12.90 29.08 -80 75 144 
Mortgage Loans -14.48 44.70 -100 100 144 
Consumer Credit Loans -14.76 32.85 -100 75 144 
Lending Standards Due to Balance Sheet Factors:      
Bank Capital Position 8.52 20.18 -25 80 144 
Bank Liquidity Position 0.39 25.01 -75 80 144 
Bank Market Financing  6.55 21.28 -25 100 144 
All Balance Sheet Factors for Mortgage Loans 10.18 22.41 -33.33 100 144 
All Balance Sheet Factors for Consumer Credit Loans 7.22 19.83 -27.5 100 144 
Perception of Risk:      
Expectations regarding general economic activity 15.94 28.89 -40 100 144 
Industry or firm-specific outlook 18.13 28.88 -50 100 144 
Risk on the collateral demanded 10.39 19.06 -25 80 144 
Expectations regarding general economic activity 13.87 27.06 -40 100 144 
Housing market prospects 14.68 24.91 -25 100 144 
Expectations regarding general economic activity 10.45 25.53 -40 100 144 
Creditworthiness of consumers 13.95 27.47 -20 100 144 
Risk on the collateral demanded 7.79 20.56 -12.5 100 144 
Loans terms and conditions:      
Margin on average for Business Loans 2.94 39.41 -80 100 144 
Margin on riskier Business Loans 25.53 29.72 -25 100 144 
Margin on average for Mortgage Loans 4.07 31.51 -66.67 100 144 
Margin on riskier for Mortgage Loans 18.26 26.28 -28.57 100 144 
Margin on average for Consumer Credit Loans 2.89 22.36 -50 100 144 
Margin on riskier for Consumer Credit Loans 10.49 22.01 -25 100 144 
Non-interest rate charges 4.94 20.37 -60 100 144 
Size of the loan or credit line 6.91 25.37 -80 100 144 
Collateral requirements 10.87 25.46 -25 100 144 
Loan covenants 6.74 22.59 -50 100 144 
Maturity 10.82 26.47 -60 100 144 
Financial factors:      
EONIA 0.32 0.34 -0.02 1.04 144 
Taylor-rule Residuals -1.02 0.52 -2.20 0.76 144 
10-year Government bond rates 4.63 4.49 0.70 25.40 144 
Growth rate of GDP -0.37 2.66 -10.40 6.00 144 
 39 
 
Bank Lending Survey Questions14  Definition  Measures 
Bank’s credit standards 
Over the past three months, how have your bank’s 
credit standards as applied to the approval of loans 
or credit lines to ….  changed? 
 
Loans or credit lines to enterprises (Qs1) 
Loans for house purchase (Qs8) 
Consumer credit and other lending (Qs8) 
Total lending Standards for: 
Business Loans 
Mortgage Loans 
Consumer Loans 
Net percentage of banks 
reporting a tightening over the 
previous quarter. 
Factors affecting bank credit standards: 
 Over the past three months, how have the following 
factors affected your bank’s credit standards as 
applied to the approval of loans or credit lines to 
…….? 
A) Cost of funds and balance 
sheet constraints  
 
C) Perception of risk  
 
Loans or credit lines to enterprises  (Qs2) 
A.1) Bank’s cost of capital 
A.2) Access to market financing 
A.3) Bank’s liquidity position      
 
All factors for house purchase (Qs9) 
All factor for consumer credit and other lending (Qs11) 
 
Expectations regarding general economic activity (Qs2) 
Industry or firm-specific outlook (Qs2) 
Risk on the collateral demanded (Qs2) 
 
Expectations regarding general economic activity (Qs9) 
Housing market prospects (Qs9) 
Expectations regarding general economic activity(Qs11) 
Creditworthiness of consumers (Qs11) 
Risk on the collateral demanded (Qs11) 
Total lending Standards for: 
Business Loans 
 
 
 
Mortgage Loans 
Consumer Loans 
 
Business Loans 
Business Loans 
Business Loans 
 
Mortgage Loans 
Mortgage Loans 
Consumer Loans  
Consumer Loans 
Consumer Loans 
Net percentage of banks 
reporting a tightening over the 
previous quarter. 
Loans terms and conditions: 
Over the past three months, how have your bank’s 
conditions and terms for approving loans or credit 
lines to ….   changed? 
 
A) Price 
B) Other conditions and terms 
A) Qs(3), Qs(10) and Qs(12) 
Your bank’s margin on average loans  
Your bank’s margin on riskier loans 
 
 
B) Qs(3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business Loans 
Mortgage Loans 
Consumer Loans 
 
 
Business Loans 
Non-interest rate charges 
Size of the loan or credit line 
Collateral requirements 
Loan covenants 
Maturity 
 
Net percentage of banks 
reporting a tightening over the 
previous quarter. 
Appendix. IV Detailed illustrations of questions posed in the BLS survey and variables used in this analysis 
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Data Sources: 
 
                                                          
14 For a complete summary of the survey carried out by the ECB, refer to https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html 
B) Qs(10) 
 
 
 
 
B) Qs(12) 
 
Mortgage Loans 
Collateral requirements  
“Loan-to-value” ratio  
Maturity 
Non-interest rate charges 
Consumer Loans 
Collateral requirements 
Maturity 
Non-interest rate charges 
Demand for Loans 
Over the past three months, how has the demand for 
loans or credit lines to …..changed at your bank, 
apart from normal seasonal fluctuations? 
 
Demand for loans to enterprises (Qs4) 
Demand for loans for house purchase (Qs13) 
Demand for loans for consumer credit (Qs13) 
Demand  
Business Loans 
Mortgage Loans 
Consumer Loans 
Net percentage of banks 
reporting an increase in loan 
demand over the previous 
quarter. 
Macroeconomic variables Definition Data Source Sample 
EONIA Quarterly average of the EONIA  overnight interest rate Eurostat 2002:Q4-2014:Q4 
Taylor-rule Residuals Residuals of a panel regression of EONIA on growth 
rate of GDP and inflation rates 
Eurostat, ECB 2002:Q4-2014:Q4 
10-year government bond yield Quarterly average of daily government bond yields Datastream 2002:Q4-2014:Q4 
Growth rate of GDP Quarterly growth rate of real GDP Eurostat 2002:Q4-2014:Q4 
Inflation rate Quarterly rate of inflation OECD 2002:Q4-2014:Q4 
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